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Abstract: This work presents a novel blockchain-based energy trading mechanism for electric vehi-
cles consisting of day-ahead and real-time markets. In the day-ahead market, electric vehicle users 
submit their bidding price to participate in the double auction mechanism. Subsequently, the smart 
match mechanism will be conducted by the charging system operator, to meet both personal inter-
ests and social benefits. After clearing the trading result, the charging system operator uploads the 
trading contract made in the day-ahead market to the blockchain. In the real-time market, the charg-
ing system operator checks the trading status and submits the updated trading results to the block-
chain. This mechanism encourages participants in the double auction to pursue higher interests, in 
addition to rationally utilize the energy unmatched in the auction and to achieve the improvement 
of social welfare. Case studies are used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model. For 
buyers and sellers who successfully participate in the day-ahead market, the total profit increase for 
buyer and seller are 22.79% and 53.54%, respectively, as compared to without energy trading. With 
consideration of social welfare in the smart match mechanism, the peak load reduces from 182 to 
146.5 kW, which is a 19.5% improvement. 
Keywords: blockchain; double auction; electricity trading; smart match mechanism 
 
1. Introduction 
Several countries have maintained an optimistic attitude towards electric vehicles 
(EVs) in recent years to reduce air pollution and to make traveling affordable [1]. In China, 
the government has planned for the development of EV industry, aiming for 5 million 
EVs by 2020, with more than 4.8 million decentralized charging stations added [2]. In the 
USA, it is foreseen that the power load curve will rise significantly (about 18%) under the 
large-scale access of EV [3]. However, there are still some deficiencies in the development 
of EV technology in, such as charging facilities, battery capacity, charging time, and other 
technical problems [4,5]. 
At present, with the development of charging and discharging technology, the elec-
tricity exchange problem between EVs and the power grid, or among EVs, has attracted 
public attention. The charging and discharging behavior of EVs has a great impact on the 
power system stability and power market operation. For example, during the peak period 
of charging, the load curve shows a sharp peak, which aggravates power imbalance, and 
further affects the market electricity price. The development of charging technology and 
energy storage technology lays a foundation for the achievement of vehicle to grid (V2G) 
[6–9] and vehicle to vehicle (V2V) [10,11]. Reference [11] shows that the electrical energy 
storage will generate a higher profit if it is cycled more frequently (hence, a higher lifetime 
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electricity output) although the lifetime is reduced due to degradation. Many topics are 
also carried out on the V2G and V2V, some of which have improved the transaction rules 
[12], discussed behavior planning from the perspective of EV owners [13,14], and consid-
ered the economic planning from the perspective of aggregators [15–17]. However, these 
methods cannot change the traditional centralized management pattern and do not give 
EV owners sufficient autonomy. Usually in these methods, EV owners only have the right 
to decide whether to participate in the charging process, but they do not reflect their spe-
cific needs, such as price sensitivity, charging urgency, and so on. In the transaction model 
proposed in this paper, the profit of EV owners will be fully considered and reflected in 
their bidding price. 
Therefore, the effective management of EV owners’ charging behavior not only can 
avoid the sharp load curve, but also improve transaction benefits and social welfare. This 
can reduce load peak. As an important topic to guide consumers’ behavior, the minimi-
zation of price is discussed considering different aspects, such as the randomness of con-
sumers’ behavior [18,19], the form of cooperation or non-cooperation game [20–22], the 
load dispatch in smart building, including EVs, photovoltaic and controllable air condi-
tioner loads [23,24], and so on. By relating all the cost and benefits with common param-
eters such as the number of charging piles, [25,26] offer a practical solution for the plan-
ning of the station size, and the solution balances the requirements between the customers 
and economic efficiency. In addition, the policy which encourages the discharging behav-
ior can also reduce negative impact on the power system. Appropriate encouragement 
strategies for sellers can improve the situation that demand exceeds supply and can stim-
ulate the competitiveness of the market. Proof of work about energy contribution, pro-
posed in [27], is an important index of subsidy distribution for sellers. According to the 
above references, the charging and discharging behavior of EVs is characterized by 
greater uncertainty, and proper guidance and planning may bring positive impact to the 
grid. In a Delaware EV project reviewed in [28], an EV aggregator acts as an intermediary 
firm between PJM and flexibility service for EVs. This aggregator sells a certain amount 
of capacity to the grid operator and bids this in the hourly auction for frequency regulation 
and for the available power capacity. Such a distributed structure is comprehensive and 
worth considering. In addition, the establishment of a reliable communication network 
can also facilitate transactions between EVs [29,30]. 
With the reform of the power system [31], the energy transaction of the distribution 
network has become a new direction of development. In addition to the EV energy trans-
action, other forms of energy transaction are also considered in [32,33]. However, privacy 
and anonymity are a difficult problem in distributed transactions. This paper takes this 
into account and uses blockchain technology to encrypt information of users. The devel-
opment of smart meters [34], low power wide area network [35], dynamic wireless charg-
ing [36], and other technologies of Internet of Things have made distributed transaction 
technologies such as blockchain possible. After the boom of bitcoin in recent years, the 
concept of blockchain has gradually penetrated into different fields. In the power system, 
blockchain generally appears together with the P2P transaction. Reference [37] also ex-
plains the importance of blockchain in P2P transaction. Getting rid of shackles from the 
traditional mode, the power system with blockchain can manage distributed energy more 
effectively. For example, credit bank [27], EV [38,39], demurrage mechanism [40], or de-
mand side management [41] are added to the framework of blockchain, all of which have 
a positive impact on the distributed management of the power system. Blockchain also 
enriches the transaction forms of the power market, such as double auction [42], peer-to-
peer (P2P) [43], energy transaction for multi-microgrids and internal microgrid [44], etc. 
Meanwhile, smart contracts have been applied in the power system, because of its fair-
ness, low-cost, and efficiency. To ensure the safety of the transaction, smart contracts were 
introduced into the energy exchange of EV in [45]. These studies show that blockchain 
changes the original centralized management of systems and avoids the risk of attack on 
central institutions. In the studies reviewed in [46], P2P trading is an important example 
Electronics 2021, 10, 307 3 of 21 
 
 
of blockchain in the energy exchange. According to research proposed there, some home-
level objects, including EV and other smart facilities, will participate in a distributed trans-
action. However, distributed transactions generally take place in small communities or 
microgrids, but how to integrate with the grid is also a key point. This paper will discuss 
the interaction between EV and grid. 
Because the system does not require an authoritative third party after using block-
chain, there is a potential danger in the security. For an information leakage problem, [47] 
improved the confidentiality mechanism in the blockchain. For collusion behavior, [48] 
proposed a blockchain-based coordination platform via Ethereum, to alleviate the harm 
caused by this behavior to some extent. 
The simple double auction model and smart match model were proposed in [49]. 
Compared with the previous work, this paper proposes a more comprehensive double 
auction model, and adds the transfer strategy of charge and discharge behavior to the 
smart match. Moreover, this paper will also introduce the combination of blockchain and 
trading mechanism in detail. Due to blockchain technology, transaction data is in public. 
Therefore, participants can receive more current or historical information from the block-
chain, which is helpful for participants to make decisions for more revenue. In the frame-
work proposed in this paper, EV owners will evaluate their own interests to make a quo-
tation and decide to take part in the double auction or not. EV owners will select to sign 
smart contracts and schedule their charging strategies based on considering operation 
cost, satisfaction of EV users, and social welfare. Blockchain is used to combine with the 
auction mechanism in this paper. On one hand, the inclusion of blockchain guarantees the 
security of transactions after the removal of third-party notarization. On the other hand, 
the auction mechanism increases the competition in the electricity market and avoids the 
vicious bidding. At the same time, the proposed mechanism allows EVs owners to choose 
an optimal price to enter the market based on their own characteristics (such as price sen-
sitivity and charging urgency), to have a greater variety of choices. 
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: 
(1) This paper proposes a novel double auction mechanism in the day-ahead market 
(DAM), where EV owners fully consider both the bidding price and quantity of en-
ergy involved. This mechanism greatly promotes the energy exchange between buy-
ers and sellers. 
(2) The charging system operator (CSO) satisfies the EVs’ demand in DAM and the real-
time market (RTM). In DAM, CSO will sign a smart contract with those who unsuc-
cessfully match in the double auction, optimizing revenue, social benefits, and par-
ticipant satisfaction. In RTM, CSO will check the trading status and record cheated 
behavior in blockchain. 
(3) Blockchain-based energy trading is proposed to ensure fairness and validity in trad-
ing and prevent swindling act. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework of 
trading mechanism. Double auction mechanism and smart match mechanism are intro-
duced in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. In Section 5, the case study is conducted to illus-
trate the effectiveness of the proposed model. Conclusion and future work are drawn in 
Section 6. The derivation of optimal bidding strategy function and proof of bidding price 
are presented in the Appendices A and B, respectively. 
2. Framework of Trading Mechanism 
2.1. Charging Token Based on Blockchain 
For the proposed energy trading, an exclusive token named Charging Token will be 
circulated to ensure trading security by using blockchain technology. Charging Token is 
applied in EVs’ trading and obtained in two ways, namely, selling energy and cashing 
with CSO. 
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The mechanism of Charging Token is partly similar to Bitcoin, which is embodied in 
the token storage and transmission technology, the construction and encryption method 
of electronic wallets. The system will create hash value for the username and wallet ad-
dress to ensure security of trading when a participant enters into the market successfully. 
After every trading is completed in RTM, the value of Charging Token of all participants 
will be updated and recorded in blockchain. 
2.2. Charging Token Based on Blockchain 
In RTM, contract violation is taken into consideration. EVs affected by violation are 
those that have been matched successfully in the DAM but are affected by the defaulters 
in RTM. These people have successfully matched with other participants in the DAM and 
uploaded the transaction content to the blockchain. However, other participants may vi-
olate in RTM, which will affect their trading behavior. For those affected by violation, the 
mechanism necessarily ensures that their economical loss is reduced to a relatively low 
level or even zero. For those violating the contract, the punishment will be conducted, 
which effectively prevents some participants from profiting by deliberately violating the 
contract. 
With the above considerations, EV users who are willing to trade, need to hand in an 
entrance fee when they enter the day-ahead part. The entrance fee, which is a form of 
deposit, is fixed for the duration of an EV’s whole trading process, unless this EV owner 
breaks the contract. 
When contract violation occurs, the compensation money will be obtained directly 
from the defaulter’s entrance fee and will be transferred to the electronic wallet of affected 
EV or CSO. EVs affected by violation will trade with CSO in RTM. 
2.3. Trading Process 
The trading process includes DAM and RTM. DAM is cleared by the double auction 
mechanism among EVs and smart match mechanism between CSO and EVs. The EVs that 
fail to match in DAM needed to enter RTM and trade with CSO at the RTM clearing price 
(RTM-CP). For buyers, RTM-CP is generally higher than DAM’s clearing price. For sellers, 
RTM-CP is generally below the DAM’s clearing price. The framework of the whole trad-
ing process is depicted in Figure 1. 
(a) In the double auction mechanism, EVs that are willing to take part in energy trading 
hand in an entrance fee and submit their bidding information, including trading role 
(buyer or seller), bidding quantity and price, and their trading time. It is worth noting 
that, when multiple participants offer the same bidding price, the credit degree is 
used as a secondary indicator to analyze the ranking sequence of participants in the 
auction. After clearing results, the EVs that fail to match, will go to the next step. 
(b) In the smart match mechanism between CSO and EVs, CSO dispatches the EVs that 
are willing to trade but fail to match. In this step, the objective is to minimize the 
operation cost of CSO and maximize the satisfaction of EVs and social welfare. The 
EVs that fail to match will go to RTM. CSO will submit all the trading contract made 
in DAM to blockchain before 6 h in the beginning of RTM. 
(c) In RTM, in every hour, CSO will check the status of trading based on the contract 
made in DAM and record the trading result in blockchain. CSO is responsible for 
satisfying the demand of EVs in the charging station. If there is a contract violation, 
the compensation and punishment mechanism will be conducted automatically. It 
should be pointed out that violators not only need to submit the penalty, but also 
their credit degree will be reduced and uploaded to the blockchain, which is very 
unfavorable in the subsequent transactions. If EV users trade successfully in RTM, 
the entrance fee will be returned to them. After trading in RTM, the trading record 
will be updated in blockchain. EV users can get information and cash with CSO. 
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When the blockchain technology is combined with the power system, the system will 
present a decentralized structure, avoiding the security risk brought by the centralized 
structure. Some security vulnerabilities are unavoidable in blockchain, so the system 
needs to face attacks against these vulnerabilities. Fortunately, blockchain has a decentral-
ized structure. When a node is attacked, the system is not severely affected. In addition, 
blockchain can be used to protect the information of users. In addition, blockchain uses 
cryptography and other security tools to design different data information storage and 
processing methods. Blockchain also has traceability and non-tampering, so the infor-
mation uploaded to blockchain is almost impossible to modify. These security features 
can guarantee the private data will not be disclosed. 
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Figure 1. Framework of the proposed model. 
3. Optimal Bidding Strategy in Double Auction Mechanism 
When EV owners are willing to participate in electricity trading at a certain time, they 
must choose the role to play in the trading, i.e., buyer or seller. Auctions, including double 
auction, are generally an incomplete information game for participants. In other words, 
the participants do not have all the characteristics, and payment functions, etc., about 
other participants, and the uncertainty can be represented by probability distribution 
mathematically. Figure 2 is the schematic diagram of double auction in this mechanism. 
As shown in Figure 2, when buyer r and buyer s make the same bidding price, their rank-
ing sequence will take into account their credit degree. The credit degree takes into ac-
count the number of violations in previous transactions. When an EV violates the trans-
action content in blockchain, CSO has the right to upload the content that records EV’s 
Electronics 2021, 10, 307 6 of 21 
 
 
reduction of credit degree to blockchain. Bidding strategy is vital in the double auction. 
The optimal bidding strategy is as follows. 
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Figure 2. Double auction mechanism. 
3.1. Optimal Bidding Strategy for Buyer 
Firstly, buyer i has an evaluation price of electricity 
val
i , which is used to estimate 
his rank expectation (denoted as i
m
 and i
n
) in the double auction mechanism. From Fig-
ure 2, it can be found that im  and in  ultimately determine the buyer’s matching results, 
which include three situations, that is, full trading, partial trading, and unsuccessful trad-
ing. In other words, the higher rank expectation is, the more advantage the buyer i has in 
double auction. im  and in can be solved by the following equations: 
b,val b,bid b,bid b,bid
1,
( ) ( )
NB
i i ik k
k k i
m m P Q  
 
    , (1)
b,val b,bid b,bid b,bid b,bid
1,
( ) ( )
NB
i i i ik k
k k i
n n P Q Q  
 
     . (2)
After determining im  and in , the buyer i will determine the probability of its 
matching state. Set a  as the auction breakpoint and o  as the value of the breakpoint a  
on the x axis. It can be seen in Figure 2, when in  is less than o , the buyer i will match 
successfully in the double auction mechanism, and when i
m
 is greater than o , the buyer 
i will fail to match. In other cases, buyers can only get less electricity than what they bid 
for. Therefore, the probability of the above three cases can be expressed as ( )iP n o ,
( )iP m o , and ( )i iP m o n  , respectively: 
 b,bid* b,bid b,val b,bid
| |
arg max [ ( | ) ( ) ( )] ( )ii i i i i i i i i
i i
o m
E m o n P m o n P n o Q
n m
  

          

, (3)
where 
| |
( | )i i i
i i
o m
E m o n
n m

 

 represents the expected ratio of buyer i’s successfully-
matched quantity to their whole demand, when im  is less than o  and in  is greater than 
o . 
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According to the above planning problem for buyers, set the bidding strategy func-
tion 
b,bid b,val( )i i    and 
b,bid( )b iP  , and the latter transforms the original function into 
the following expression: 
b,bid* 1 b,bid b,bid 1 b,bid b,bidarg max( ( ( )) ( ( ) ))i b i i i iP Q     
     . (4)
The simplified planning problem is similar to the form in Reference [50]. Through 
the derivation reported in Reference [50], the expression of the optimal bidding strategy 
function can be obtained and is given as below: 
b,val
b
b,val b,val 0
b,val
b
( )
( )
( )
i
i i
i
P x dx
P

  

 
 . (5)
Appendices A and B shows the derivation of optimal bidding strategy function and 
provides the proof that the optimal bidding strategy function above to maximize earnings 
of buyer i, i.e., the optimal solution to the planning problem. 
3.2. Optimal Bidding Strategy for Seller 
The optimal bidding strategy from the seller’s perspective is similar to that of the 
buyer. 
The rank expectation of seller j (denoted as jp  and jq ) is expressed as follows: 
s,val s,val s,val s,bid
1,
( ) ( )
NS
j j jk k
k k j
p p P Q  
 
    , (6)
s,val s,val s,val s,bid s,bid
1,
( ) ( )
NS
j j j jk k
k k j
q q P Q Q  
 
     . (7)
The planning problem that seller j should offer his bidding is mathematically de-
scribed as follows: 
 s,bid* s,bid s,val s,bid
| |
arg max [ ( | ) ( ) ( )] ( )
j
j j j j j j j j j
j j
o p
E p o q P p o q P q o Q
q p
  

          

 
(8)
Similarly, for sellers, set the bidding strategy function 
s,bid s,val( )i i    and 
s,bid
s ( )iP  , and the latter transforms the original function into the following expression: 
s,bid* 1 s,bid s,bid 1 s,bid s,bid
sarg max( ( ( )) ( ( ) ))i i i i iP Q     
    
. (9)
It should be noted that the boundary condition is 
,
max( ) 0
s bid   , which is different 
from the situation for buyers as shown in Appendices A and B. Hence, the optimal bid-
ding strategy function for seller j is: 
s,val
max
s,val s
s,val s,val s,val s,val
max s max s,val
s
( )
( ) ( )
( )
j
j j
j
P x dx
P
P


    

   
 . (10)
After buyers and sellers submit their bidding information, the trading price is cleared 
and set as the mean value of the bidding price of the seller and buyer to have a successful 
match [51]. 
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4. Smart Match Mechanism 
After double auction among EVs, some participants achieved their purpose (buying 
or selling electricity) and left DAM. The remaining participants are at a deadlock because 
their bidding prices cannot be matched. The transaction cannot proceed unless the re-
maining participants compromise their bidding price or other trading policies are pro-
vided. It was pointed out that a detailed correlation between blockchain, power market 
mechanism, EV charging stations, sustainability, social responsibility, corporate govern-
ance, and business performance is essential for smart cities development to enhance qual-
ity of life [52–54]. Therefore, in the smart match mechanism, CSO has the right to manage 
the charge and discharge strategy, conduct the shift strategy among these unmatched EVs 
in the double auction mechanism, and aim to pursue higher personal gains as well as 
social welfare. 
In the shift strategy, CSO offers a price that may be higher than RTM-CP in the double 
auction mechanism to the unmatched seller and a price that may be lower than RTM-CP 
in the double auction mechanism to the unmatched buyer. However, participants in the 
smart match will not be able to control their charge and discharge time. Through buying 
energy from unmatched sellers and selling energy to unmatched buyers, CSO dispatches 
unmatched EVs’ charge and discharge strategy. In other words, CSO changes buyers’ 
charge and sellers’ discharge behavior to meet their demand according to their parking 
time in the charging station. Figure 3 shows the shift strategy. Considering the behavior 
of EV users, as an example, the EV parking time is set as 8 h, and charging and discharging 
behavior will be managed in 8 h. 
Unmatched in 
double auction
period t period t+1 period t+2
Matched Unmatched
……
…… Matched
period t+n
Parking 
period t+n+1 ……
…… Parking 
period t+7
Parking time of EV i
Charging/discharging time of EV in original plan
Shift strategy of CSO  
Figure 3. Shift strategy of CSO in smart match mechanism. 
4.1. Objective Function 
op 1 sat 2 swmin C C w w       (11)
The optimization problem of CSO consists of three components, i.e., operational cost, 
satisfaction of EV, and social welfare. Operational cost includes the net cost of buying 
energy from unmatched sellers and selling energy to unmatched buyers: 
s,ori s b,ori b
op , CSO, , CSO,
1 1 1
( )
NT NS NB
j t j i t i
t j i
C Q Q 
  
      . (12)
CSO also considers the satisfaction of EV users, including the cost of trading with 
CSO in RTM and the difference of contract price and original bidding price of unmatched 
EVs. Mean and variance are considered to evaluate the price difference: 
b s
sat sat, sat,
1 1
NB NS
i j
i j
  
 
   , (13)
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b,ori b,ori b,bid
, , ,
b b 2 b,ori b1
sat, CSO, , RTM,
b,ori b,ori 1
, ,
1
=( ) (1 )
NT
i t i t i t NT
t
i i i i t iNT
t
i t i t
t
Q I
Q
Q I

   


 
    




, (14)
s,ori s,ori s,bid
, , ,
s s 2 s,ori s1
sat, CSO, , RTM,
s,ori s,ori 1
, ,
1
=( ) (1 )
NT
j t j t j t NT
t
j j j j t jNT
t
j t j t
t
Q I
Q
Q I

   


 
    




. 
(15)
In addition to satisfying the EVs’ demand, CSO also has social welfare to minimize 
the power unbalance of the system. CSO should consider the forecasted demand of sub-
urban system in DAM.   denotes the market shares of charging station: 
fore net
sw CSO,
1
NT
t t
t
D P 

   . (16)
Net power in charging station is denoted as follows: 
net s,sh b,sh s,ori s,ori b,ori b,ori
CSO, , , , , , ,
1 1 1 1
( ) ( (1 ) (1 ) )
NS NB NS NB
t j t i t j j t i t i i t i t
j i j i
P Q Q I Q I Q 
   
            
. 
(17)
4.2. Constraints 
(a) Physical constraints: 
b b,ori s s.ori
, , , ,
1 1 1 1
 ,   
NT NT NT NT
i t i t j t j t
t t t t
I I I I
   
    
. 
(18)
In the shift strategy, the shift time is limited, to avoid the charge and discharge strat-
egy too scattered: 
8 8 8 8
b,sh b,ori b,ori s,sh s,ori s,ori
, , , , , ,
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1
16 16 16 16
b,sh b,ori b,ori s,sh s,ori s,ori
, , , , , ,
t 9 t 9 t 9 t 9
b,sh b,ori
, ,
  ,  
  ,  
i t i i t i t j t j j t j t
i t i i t i t j t j j t j t
i t i i t
Q Q I Q Q I
Q Q I Q Q I
Q Q
 
 

   
   
     
     
  
   
   
24 24 24 24
b,ori s,sh s,ori s,ori
, , , ,
t 17 t 17 t 17 t 17
 ,  i t j t j j t j tI Q Q I
   








   


   
. (19)
Constraint (19) is utilized to ensure the same energy charged or discharged as the 
original plan in the parking time after the shift strategy. Considering the behavior of EV 
users, the EV parking time is set as 8 h, hence the dispatch time is decomposed into three 
parts. 
(b) Trading constraints: 
b b,sh b s s,sh s
, , , , , ,
1 1
    i t i t i t j t j t j tI Q M I I Q M I
M M
       ，
. 
(20)
Constraint (20) shows the relationship between the transferred power and the trans-
ferred state and the shift energy is limited to zero when the shift status is zero at time slot 
t. M is a big positive number. 
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b s
, ,     i t i j t jI I  ， , (21)
b s
CSO, CSO,      i i j jM M      ， . (22)
Constraints (21) and (22) show that when CSO does not sign contract with EVs, the 
price offered by CSO and shift status will be set as zero. 
b,sh sh s,sh sh
, max , max0   ,  0i t j tQ Q Q Q    . (23)
Constraint (23) sets the charge and discharge rate per hour below the maximum. 
b,ori s,ori
, ,  ,  
NT NT
i i t j j t
t t
I I    . (24)
Constraint (24) gives the relationship between contract formation status and initial 
charge (or discharge) state. 
b b,auc s s,auc
, , , ,1   ,   1i t i t j t j tI I I I    . (25)
Constraint (25) indicates that the shift strategy cannot transfer the service within the 
time, in which trading happened between EVs. 
To reduce computational complexity, the absolute value in Equation (16) is replaced 
by auxiliary variables 1
t  and 2
t : 
fore net
CSO, 1 2+ 0
t t
t tD P      , (26)
1 20  ,   0  ,
t t t    . (27)
The social welfare function is transformed into Equation (28) as shown below: 
sw 1 2
1
= ( + )
NT
t t
t
  

 . (28)
5. Results and Discussion 
The effectiveness and validity of the proposed model are proved by utilizing the EV 
data obtained from [55]. 140 EV buyers and 100 EV sellers are chosen to take part in the 
double auction mechanism. The data of 240 participants will be shown partly in Appendix 
C. After the double auction mechanism, the EVs that do not match successfully will par-
ticipate in the smart match process automatically. The trading result is cleared by CSO. 
The constant parameters used in the experiment are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Constant parameters used in the experiment. 
b
RTM,i  
($/kWh) 
s
RTM, j  
($/kWh) 
1w  2w  
sh
maxQ  (kWh)   M  
0.25 0.15 1000 100 50 0.05 1000 
Three cases will be considered. Case 1 is to demonstrate the effectiveness of the dou-
ble auction mechanism. Case 2 focuses on the significance of the smart match conducted 
by CSO. Case 3 is utilized to show the blockchain interface. Case 1 and Case 2 are con-
ducted on a Windows 10 64-bit personal computer with Intel Core i5-6500 3.2 GHz CPU 
and 8 GB of RAM using MATLAB 2016b with YALMIP and Gurobi. Case 3 is conducted 
by Python 3.8 and Postman. 
  
Electronics 2021, 10, 307 11 of 21 
 
 
5.1. Double Auction Mechanism 
In Case 1, it is assumed that the price of electricity has a standard normal distribution 
and the mean value is set as 0.2 $/kWh. The charging price and discharging price in RTM 
are set as 0.25 and 0.15 $/kWh, respectively. After EV users submit their bidding price, the 
double auction mechanism is cleared by CSO. In Figure 4, the bidding price of all partici-
pants at hour 5 is ranked by price and the left part of intersection is regarded as a success-
ful match. For the rest, buyer and seller fail to close the deal. 
According to price ranking in Figure 4, Buyer 13 will buy 4.2 kWh electricity from 
Seller 16 and 2.2 kWh electricity from Seller 54 in hour 5. The trading price is set as mean 
value of bidding price of buyer and seller. Buyer 30 and Seller 69 cannot match and will 
take part in the smart match automatically. The evaluation and the quantity are important 
indicators of participants’ bidding price. From the buyer’s point of view, the evaluation 
price of Buyers 13, 22, and 30 are 0.1972, 0.1967, and 0.1603 $/kWh, respectively, and the 
electricity quantity are 6.6, 4.4 and 1.1 kWh, respectively. Buyer 13 has the highest elec-
tricity quantity (equal to 6.6 kWh) and the highest evaluation price (equal to 0.1972 $/kWh) 
in the 5th hour, so this is the highest bidding price (equal to 0.2034 $/kWh) to maximize 
the successful trading probability. From the seller’s point of view, the evaluation price of 
Sellers 16, 54, 29 and 69 are 0.1842, 0.1861, 0.1866 and 0.2094 $/kWh, respectively, and the 
electricity quantity are 4.4, 5.5, 1.1, and 6.6 kWh, respectively. Seller 16 has the lowest 
evaluation (equal to 0.1842 $/kWh), so this is the lowest bidding price (equal to 0.1834 
$/kWh) to maximize the successful trading probability. 
 
Figure 4. Bidding information at hour 5. 
5.2. Smart Match Mechanism 
In Case 2, CSO optimizes the shift strategy, considering the satisfaction of EV users 
and social welfare, which are both introduced detailly in Section 4. For the satisfaction of 
EV users, CSO will select some of the unsuccessful matching EVs to sign the contract and 
minimize the deviation between the bidding price and contract price. For the social wel-
fare, CSO will manage the charging and discharging time of EVs, adjust the net power of 
the charging station, and make the integrated load smooth, considering forecasted load of 
the distribution system and market shares of the charging station. As an organization that 
pursues profits, the CSO has an appropriate incentive to pursue higher benefits out of the 
consideration of benefits, such as benefits obtained by improving the balance of the load 
curve. 
The suburban load curve is shown in Figure 5 [56]. Figure 6 shows the effectiveness 
of the shift strategy from the perspective of a CSO. In this case, the market share of selected 
CSO is set to 5%, which is reflected in the order of magnitude of Figures 5 and 6. In Figure 
6, it can be easily found that the total power consumption (including urban power con-
sumption and EV power consumption) is effectively adjusted to a flatter level after the 
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implementation of the transfer strategy. Especially in the 16th–24th hours, the effect is 
obvious. In the 20th and 21st hours, the peak power consumption of the whole day will 
be greatly weakened, and this part of the power consumption will be transferred to 23rd 
and 24th hours. The shift strategy can alleviate the load peak effectively by reducing the 
quantity from 182 to 146.5 kW, which is a 19.5% improvement. It will help reduce the 
pressure on the power distribution operation. 
 
Figure 5. Load curve. 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of load curve. 
5.3. Analysis of Global Indicators in Cases 1 and 2 
The day-ahead market consists of Cases 1 and 2. Firstly, the global situation of the 
double auction in Case 1 is analyzed. Tables 2 and 3 show the result of the buyer and seller 
in the double auction with a different bidding price strategy. The former is under the op-
timized bidding method proposed in this paper, and the latter is under the original bid-
ding method in [50]. For buyers who successfully participate in DAM, the profit is defined 
as cost reduction obtained by cost with trading minus cost without trading. For sellers 
who successfully participate in DAM, the profit is defined as a revenue enhancement ob-
tained by revenue with trading minus revenue without trading: 
b b b s s s
,nt ,t ,t ,nt,  i i i j j jP C C P R R    . (29)
Through the comparison of Tables 2 and 3, it can be found that the optimal bidding 
method proposed in this paper will greatly promote the matching between buyers and 
sellers, in which the number of transactions increases from 24 to 119, and the total profit 
increases from $ 6.48 to $ 32.44. This is because the optimal bidding price proposed in this 
paper considers rank expectation, including value price and bidding quantity. On the con-
trary, the original bidding price only considers the value price, so the bidding price with 
original method cannot match precisely. Therefore, participants with the optimal strategy 
are more likely to match successfully in the double auction than those with the original 
strategy. 
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Table 2. Result of the double auction mechanism with optimal bidding price. 
 
Number of 
Transactions 
Total Profit ($) 
Total Profit Increase 
(%) 
Mean of 
Profit ($) 
Buyer 68 18.45 22.74 0.271 
Seller 51 13.99 28.75 0.274 
Total 119 32.44 - 0.273 
Table 3. Result of the double auction mechanism with original bidding price. 
 
Number of 
Transactions 
Total Profit ($) 
Total Profit Increase 
(%) 
Mean of 
Profit ($) 
Buyer 13 3.15 19.42 0.242 
Seller 11 3.33 34.28 0.303 
Total 24 6.48 - 0.270 
Table 4 shows the result of the buyer and seller in the smart match mechanism. After 
the double auction mechanism and smart match mechanism, both buyer and seller will 
obtain profit, which is detailed in Table 5. 
Table 4 shows the global information in the smart match. It can be seen that partici-
pants will get more profits in the smart match than in the double auction. The mean of 
profit in the smart match is $ 0.496, which is significantly higher than $ 0.273 in the double 
auction. However, according to the smart match mechanism, their charging and discharg-
ing behavior will be managed and their bidding time will be shifted to another time. 
Table 5 shows the trading information of the whole process in the day-ahead market, 
which includes the double auction and smart match. Some EVs cannot complete the trans-
action in the day-ahead market due to over valuation or malicious bidding, so they need 
to enter the real-time market and accept the real-time price. Therefore, the trading mech-
anism can also avoid the malicious bidding to a certain extent. In the 5th hour, for exam-
ple, Buyer 30 enters DAM with a very low bidding price, which can be seen as a malicious 
bidding. Obviously, this bidding will not be accepted in the double auction, because no 
seller is willing to accept such a low price as shown in Figure 4. Similarly, it will not be 
accepted by the CSO in the smart match, because CSO can select participants with better 
bidding from the 5th hour and nearby hours. 
Table 4. Result of the smart match. 
 
Number of 
Transactions 
Total Profit ($) 
Total Profit Increase 
(%) 
Mean of 
Profit ($) 
Buyer 134 54.70 29.55 0.408 
Seller 90 56.42 68.12 0.627 
Total 224 111.12 - 0.496 
Table 5. Result of the day-ahead trading process (including double auction and smart match). 
 
Number of 
Transactions 
Total Profit ($) 
Total Profit Increase 
(%) 
Mean of 
Profit ($) 
Buyer 139 73.15 22.79 0.526 
Seller 100 70.42 53.54 0.704 
Total 239 143.57 - 0.601 
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5.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
Figure 7 describes the mean value of profit of buyers and sellers in the double auction 
mechanism and the whole trading process. In Figure 7a, the number of buyers is 140 and 
the number of sellers changes from 100 to 170. In Figure 7b, the number of sellers is 140 
and the number of buyers changes from 100 to 170. For each situation, the number of 
participants changes. Because the evaluation of electricity is in random normal form, 
when the number of buyers or sellers changes, the evaluation of electricity changes. The 
bidding strategy will change based on the evaluation, leading to different trading results. 
From Figure 7, it can be seen that mean value of profit in the double auction is changed 
from $ 0.25 to $ 0.4, and mean value of profit in trading is changed from $ 0.47 to $ 0.7. 
Participants can always gain profits from the trading mechanism. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 7. (a). Profit with the change of the number of sellers. (b). Profit with the change of the number of buyers. 
5.5. Application of Blockchain 
Python is used to build a blockchain and interact information by software Postman 
to simulate the process of trading. 
First, buyers and sellers participating in the day-ahead market need to upload and 
publish their own information, including electricity quantity, price, and entry time. Their 
user names are kept confidential with hash values, and other information is always open. 
The username of Buyer 125 is converted to hash value 
“81ef01a9fed5a1f0cc89ea14730f061570cb79 5474163307725f07f6a5e5b20e”, which pre-
vents personal information from being leaked. In addition, the hash value of the previous 
block, proof of work, and timestamp is also included in the block. These indicators ensure 
the normal continuation of the blockchain. 
After receiving the personal information uploaded by participants, miners will use a 
cryptographic hash algorithm to solve the hash value. The first miner who figures out the 
correct hash will get the right to validate the transaction into blocks and records it on the 
blockchain. The miner will then receive some tokens as a reward. 
The double auction and smart match will generate some matching information, such 
as buyer i matches seller j, buyer k matches CSO, and so on. After the matching result is 
uploaded to the blockchain, as the final clear result and requirements for participants to 
trade according to the block. Punishment is necessary for those who violate the block. 
Blockchain is open and transparent. Therefore, even without third-party supervision, the 
security of the trading process is guaranteed. This mechanism can improve the security of 
transactions between EVs. Various business models needed to be considered [57]. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper presents a novel electricity trading mechanism for EV charging stations, 
mainly including double auction, smart match, and blockchain mechanism. A total of 140 
EVs are selected as buyers and 100 EVs as sellers, to simulate a charging station model 
and consider the interaction with the power grid utilizing suburban load in the distribu-
tion system. From the perspective of personal interest, the number of successful transac-
tions increases from 24 to 119 and the total return increases from $ 6.48 to $ 32.44 after the 
rank expectation proposed is considered. Due to the introduction of rank expectation, par-
ticipants can understand more clearly about other participants in the auction and make 
more accurate judgments, resulting in a significant increase in the number of successful 
transactions. Smart match mechanism reduces the impact on the power grid by schedul-
ing the charging and discharging behavior of EVs with consideration of satisfaction of EV 
users. Simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model. EV users can 
benefit from the double auction mechanism and smart match mechanism. From the per-
spective of social welfare, the peak load reduces from 182 to 146.5 kW, which is a 19.5% 
improvement after executing the smart match. This is because social welfare, referred to 
in this paper as the fluctuating level of load, is taken fully into account. To sum up, the 
trading mechanism can not only absorb nearby energy, but also has a positive impact on 
the grid stability. A number of issues in the electric vehicle industry have to be considered, 
such as policy implementation, technology innovation, and the whole supply chain. This 
work will be considered in the near future. 
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Nomenclature 
Variables and Functions: 
,i im n  Rank expectation of buyer i 
,j jp q  Rank expectation of seller j 
b,val s,val,i j   Evaluation price of buyer i and seller j 
b,bid s,bid,i j   Bidding price of buyer i and seller j 
b,bid s,bid,i jQ Q  Bidding quantity of buyer i and seller j 
P  Probability function 
b s,P P  Probability function for bidding of buyer and seller 
b,bid* s,bid*,i j   Optimal bidding price of buyer i and seller j 
E  Mathematical expectation 
  Bidding strategy function 
b,ori s,ori
, ,,i t j tI I  Original trading status of buyer i and seller j 
b,ori s,ori
, ,,i t j tQ Q  Original trading quantity of buyer i and seller j 
b,bid s,bid
, ,,i t j t   Bidding price of buyer i and seller j in double auction 
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b,auc s,auc
, ,,i t j tI I  Trading status of buyer i and seller j in double auction 
obj  Objective function of charging system operator 
opC  Operational cost 
sat  Satisfaction of EV users 
sw  Social welfare 
b s
CSO, CSO,,i j   Price that charging system operator provides to buyer i and seller j 
b s
sat, sat ,,i j   Satisfaction of buyer i and seller j 
,i j   Trading status of charging system operator with buyer i /seller j 
net
CSO,tP  Net power of charging station 
b s
, ,,i t j tI I  Trading status of buyer i and seller j in smart match mechanism 
,sh ,sh
, ,,
b s
i t j tQ Q  Quantity shifted of buyer i and seller j in smart match mechanism 
1 2,
t t   Auxiliary variable 
F  Bidding strategy function 
b s,i jP P  Profit of buyer i and seller j 
b b
,nt ,t,i iC C  Cost of buyer i without trading and with trading 
s s
,nt ,t,j jR R  Revenue of seller j without trading and with trading 
Constants and Sets: 
a  Breakpoint in double auction mechanism 
o  The value of the breakpoint a  on the x axis 
s,bid s,val
max max,   Maximum bidding price and evaluation price of seller 
,NB NS  Number of buyer and seller 
NT  Number of time slot 
b s
RTM, RTM,,i j   Price offered to buyer i and seller j in real-time market 
1 2,w w  Weight value in objective function 
sh
maxQ  Maximum quantity shifted in smart match mechanism 
  Market shares of charging station 
fore
tD  Forecasted demand in distribution system 
M  Big positive constant 
Appendix A 
Define 
b,bid b.bid 1 b,bid b,bid 1 b,bid( )= ( ( ) ) ( ( ))i i i i b iF Q P     
    , and the bidding function 
is expressed as: 
b,bid* b,bid b.bid 1 b,bid b,bid 1 b,bid
barg max( ( )) arg max( ( ( ) ) ( ( )))i i i i i iF Q P      
      . (A1)
Then according to the first order optimal condition, the derivative of the objective 
function with respect to ib  is equal to 0 at the maximum. Hence: 
b,bid 1 b,bid 1 b,bid 1 b,bid 1 b,bid b,bid
b b0 [ ( ( )) ( ( ))( ( )) '( ( ) )]i i i i i iQ P p        
        . (A2)
Considering 
1
1
1
( (b )) '
'( (b ))
i
i

 


 , the following equation can be obtained: 
b,val b,val b,bid b,val b,val
b ( )( ) ( ) '( ) 0i i i b i ip P        . (A3)
Equation (A3) simplifies to: 
Electronics 2021, 10, 307 17 of 21 
 
 
b,val b,val b,val b,val
b b( ( ) ( )) ( )i i i i
i
d
P p
dv
     . (A4)
The boundary condition is (0) 0  . By integrating both sides of Equation (A4) from 
0 to iv : 
b,val
b,val b,val
b b
0
( ) ( ) (x)
i
i iP xp dx

     . (A5)
After simplification, the optimal bidding strategy function is expressed as: 
b,val
b
b,val b,val 0
b,val
b
( )
( )
( )
i
i i
i
P x dx
P

  

 

. 
Appendix B 
In Appendix A, the derivative of the objective function is proved to be 0 when bid-
ding price is 
b,val( )i  . However, the second-order sufficient condition has not yet been 
proved, so it is not known whether 
b,bid b,val( )i i    is a maximum, a minimum, or even 
not an extremum. Hence, the following is proved for its second order sufficient condition. 
The derivative of optimal bidding strategy function is: 
b,val
b,val
b b
b,val 0
b,val 2
b
( ) ( )
'( )
( )
i
i
i
i
p P x dx
P


 



 . (A6)
From Equation (A6), it can be seen that 
b,val'( ) 0i   , because 
b,val( )b iP   and its de-
rivative are not negative for any 
b,val
i . 
According to Equation (A2), the derivative of the objective function can be expressed 
as: 
b,bid
b,bid 1 b,bid 1 b,bid 1 b,bid b,bid
b
1 b,bid
b
1 b,bid 1 b,bid b,bid
b,bid 1 b,bidb
b1 b,bid
'( )
[ ( ( ))( ( )) '( ( ) )
              ( ( ))]
( ( ))( ( ) )
= [ ( ( ))]
'( ( ))
i
i i i i i
i
i i i
i i
i
F
Q p
P
p
Q P

      
 
    
 
  
  

 


  


 
. (A7)
So, the second derivative of the objective function can be expressed as: 
b,val
b,bid b,bid
b,val
1 b,bid b,val b,bid 1 b,bidb
bb,val
b,val b,valb
b 0 b
b,val b,val b,val b,val
b
''( ) /
( )
( ) [ ( )) ' ( ) 2 ( )( ( )]'
'( )
( )( ) ( )1
( ) 2
'( ) '( ) ( ) '( )
i
i i
i
i i i i i
i i
i i
i i i i i
F Q
pd
p v
dv
P x dxp pd
dv P



     
 
 
      
     
   

. (A8)
Considering 
b,val'( ) 0i    and 
b,val( ) 0b iP   , multiply both sides of Equation (A8) 
by 
b,val b,val
b'( ) ( )i iP   , the following equation is obtained: 
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b,val
b,bid b,val b,val b,bid
b
b,val
b,val b,valb
b b bb,val b,val 0
''( ) '( ) ( ) /
( )
( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( )
'( )
i
i i i i
i
i i
i i
F P Q
pd
P x dx p P
d

   

 
  
 
   
. (A9)
Substituting 
b,val
b,val
b b
b,val 0
b,val 2
b
( ) ( )
'( )
( )
i
i
i
i
p P x dx
P


 




 in Equation (A9), the following 
equation could be obtained: 
b,val
b,val
b,val
b,val b,val b,bid
b
b,val 2
b,val b,valb
b b bb,val 0
0
b,val 3
b,val b,val b,val b,vab
b b b b
b
0
  ''( ) '( ) ( ) /
( )
( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( )
( )
( )
2 ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) (
( )
i
i
i
i i i i
i
i i
i
b
i
i i i i
F b P Q
Pd
P x dx p P
d
P x dx
P
p P p P
P x dx



  

 


   
 
   
    



b,val
l
b,val 3
b
b
0
)
( )
0
( )
i
iP
P x dx


  

. (A10)
It is identified that 
b,bid''( ) 0iF   . The highest earnings could be obtained when 
buyer i adopts the bidding strategy 
b,bid b,val( )i i   . 
Appendix C 
Table A1 shows the charging behavior of buyers numbered 1 to 10 out of 140 buyers 
and buyers numbered 1 to 10 out of 100 buyers in 24 h. Each row represents a time period, 
each column represents a buyer’s/seller’s number, and the data in the table represent the 
charging/discharging quantity in kWh. 
Table A1. Partial data of buyers’ charging/sellers’ discharging behavior. 
 Buyers Sellers 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.2 0 0 1.1 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 1.1 0 1.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 3.3 1.1 1.1 0 0 1.1 1.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.2 0 0 
13 0 0 0 6.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.3 0 0 0 0 
14 0 2.2 0 5.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 0 0 0 0 0 
15 3.3 2.2 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 0 0 0 0 1.1 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 3.3 2.2 0 0 0 1.1 0 0 0 1.1 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.2 0 1.1 0 6.6 0 2.2 0 0 3.3 0 0 0 
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18 0 1.1 0 0 0 2.2 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 0 1.1 2.2 0 0 0 0 2.2 
19 1.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.6 4.4 1.1 4.4 0 0 0 
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 6.6 0 0 0 3.3 2.2 0 0 6.6 0 2.2 1.1 
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.4 0 0 0 2.2 0 0 0 2.2 0 0 6.6 
22 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.6 
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.4 
24 0 0 0 0 0 5.5 1.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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